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ABSTRACT: In this paper, I take up the conciliatory-steadfast debate occurring within social epistemology
in regards to the phenomenon of peer disagreement. I will argue, because the conciliatory perspective allows us to understand argumentation pragmatically—as a method of problem-solving within a community
rather than as a method for obtaining the truth—that in most cases, we should not simply agree to disagree.
KEYWORDS: epistemology of disagreement, pragmatism, social epistemology.

1. INTRODUCTION
On October 30th, 2010, political pundits and comedians Jon Stewart and Stephen Colbert
held what was hazardously dubbed the “Rally to Restore Sanity And/Or Fear” on the
Washington Mall. Of the many things this rally may have accomplished—and the many
more that it did not—what captured my attention, and the attention of many people in the
“blogosphere,” was the emphasis placed by the speakers and attendees on the tone of political discourse and the function of disagreement. I include here just a sample of the
views expressed about civil discourse and disagreement on various signs and placards at
the rally: “I disagree with you but I’m pretty sure you’re not Hitler,” “We may disagree
on a lot but I’m sure we agree on some things—do you like toast?” “I respectfully disagree with your opinions but I still value you as a person,” “civil is sexy,” “Signs are an
impractical medium for civil discourse.” While these signs certainly elicit chuckles, what
do they say about disagreement and civility in political discourse? Are they themselves
examples of political discourse, civil or otherwise, or are they something else altogether?
Scott McLemee, in his post for Inside Higher Ed (2010), argues that the StewartColbert rally supported “the attitude that it’s better to stay cool and amused than to risk
making arguments or expressing too much ardor—this is not civility. It’s timidity.” In
response to this post, blogger Robert Minto (2010) suggests it is not timidity about engaging in argument that was in evidence at the Stewart-Colbert rally, but rather passiveaggression. However, passive-aggression is no more civil than is timidity. He writes,
passive-aggressive people quietly oppose what you’re saying by trying to delegitimize it on
presumably universal rhetorical grounds. They want to fight at a meta-level, in a way that
doesn’t appear at all pugnacious. Rather than timidity, I see this as an extraordinary arrogance, an utter unwillingness to actually go ahead and take a position from which they might
actually be demonstrated to be wrong. Passive-aggression is a folding of political struggle into social struggle—rather than right or wrong, just or unjust, the operative valuations become
couth or uncouth, polite or impolite.
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The issue of civility in political discourse—and whether and to what degree it is an issue
worth discussing—is ubiquitous in the blogosphere. On his blog, zunguzungu (2010)
takes note of the degree to which the Stewart-Colbert rally was not political at all; in fact,
it was precisely and purposefully apolitical. In response to someone who thought the irony of the rally was its most redemptive feature, zunguzungu writes, “Americans who
want to emphasize that ‘politics isn’t all there is to life’ are people who don’t feel very
keenly the sting of injustice or the anxiety of uncertainty or the horror of what this country does in our name.” He further quotes Mike Barthel (2010), another blogger who
writes, “All the Daily Show is about at this point is notifying us of uncivil, awful things that
have no real impact on anything and would remain relatively obscure if Stewart didn’t tell
us about them.” He also points out that what Americans (and others who are similarly situated) are really looking for is “the tabloid version of politics.” However, he rightly points
out, “Spending all day eagerly consuming news about political gossip and outrage and then
complaining about how much gossip and outrage there is out there is the very definition of
hypocritical.” Yet despite their criticisms, these bloggers do not necessarily step outside
this meta-political game of determining who and what is appropriately civil. What interests
me, however, and what is relevant for the purposes of this paper, is the meta-political direction politics has taken, where attempting to be civil, and criticizing incivility, is considered
the hallmark of political activism and civic duty. I hope to elucidate the role of disagreement within this context so that it may be possible to know what to do with it when we encounter it, and thus return to the actual political work of solving pressing issues.
This is not to say that (philosophical) conversations about civil discourse are
invaluable. Surely, there are a great many important things to learn still about disagreement and its role within civil discourse. Indeed, many philosophers—typically of a critical bent—have done excellent work to show that the form of political communication
may well matter as much as the content of political communication. For example, Amy
Gutmann and Dennis Frank Thompson (1996) suggest meta-political issues should also
be subject to the rules and guidelines of deliberative democracy.1 As they put it,
The moral authority of collective judgments about policy depends in part on the moral quality
for the process by which citizens collectively reach those judgments. Deliberation is the most
appropriate way for citizens collectively to resolve their moral disagreements not only about
policies but also about the process by which policies should be adopted. Deliberation is not
only a means to an end, but also a means for deciding what means are morally required to
pursue our common ends. (p. 4)

1

It might be argued that I am duplicating the efforts of those who have discussed the issue of disagreement within the sphere of deliberative democracy. In particular, Amy Gutmann’s and Dennis Frank
Thompson’s text Democracy and Disagreement (1996) would seem to have already discussed at great
length the issues I claim to be interested in here. And certainly it’s true that they have. I do, however,
aim to present a unique defense of the same conclusion reached by these authors, that “when citizens or
their representatives disagree morally, they should continue to reason together to reach mutually acceptable decisions” (p. 1). The defense I offer will be pragmatist in nature, and will draw on recent work in social epistemology regarding peer disagreement, which I introduce in greater detail below. Moreover,
whereas Gutmann and Thompson explicitly state as their goal a determination of “the theoretical principles that should guide moral argumenta and their implications for actual moral disagreements about public
policy” (p. 1), I will pursue a defense of deliberation itself, as an appropriate response to disagreement.
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In other words, the meta-political work done by pundits like Stewart and Colbert is not
altogether useless. Indeed, interrogating the quality of our deliberations is a valuable task.2
Not surprisingly, discussions about civility and incivility in political discourse
are bound up with debates over universalism and relativism in philosophy. A lack of civility is often premised on a universalist or objective view of truth, where reasonable disagreement is impossible because there is only one correct answer to any question, belief
about any fact, or opinion on any matter. The tactics used to persuade others of the true
answer is, of course, worthy of debate. However, a lack of civility can also indicate an
extreme relativist position too. As McLemee (2010) notes, the unwillingness to engage in
argument and debate that naturally arises out of disagreement can be a measure of timidity, not of civility. On this view, everyone is welcome and perhaps even encouraged to
disagree. In other words, the move away from the incivility expressed by those who
would liken presidents to idiots or fascists can lead to a different sort of incivility that is
perhaps more akin to an ironic apathy. The task, therefore, is to find a form or style of
civility that sees disagreement as productive, but not as an end. This does not, however,
require the postulation of an absolute truth—indeed, there can be another basis for seeking agreement, one that develops out of pragmatism. It is this basis I hope to elaborate in
this paper, which will interrogate the phenomenon of peer disagreement from a pragmatist perspective that is heavily influenced by the work of Richard Rorty.
It is within this context that my engagement with the issue of peer disagreement
occurs. What happens when arguments lead not to agreement, but to disagreement instead? Social epistemologists recently have been investigating the phenomenon of peer
disagreement, which arises when peers have divergent or even opposing beliefs, despite
the fact that they possess equal intellectual capacities and the same evidence. Those
working in the area have outlined two possible responses when faced with such a situation. Those who advocate the “conciliatory” perspective argue it is epistemically better to
suspend belief in the face of disagreement with one’s peers. Those who oppose the conciliatory perspective support the “steadfast” perspective, arguing on practical grounds that
it is impossible to suspend belief every time one is faced with such disagreement. In this
paper, I offer a pragmatist reading of the debate over peer disagreement. I apply the defense used by those who support the conciliatory view to the steadfast view, and viceversa. That is, I provide an epistemic evaluation of the steadfast position, and a practical
evaluation of the conciliatory position, and suggest that the latter view is better for both
epistemic and practical reasons. I conclude that, if we understand argumentation and disa2

So it is true that the task of determining where the line between civility and incivility resides is a valuable and likely a difficult task, in part because it can be emotionally taxing. On Inside Higher Ed (2010),
Susan Herbst makes note of the impact uncivil discourse can have on people. She writes, “More recent
struggles with nasty partisan fighting in Washington may not be unique in our history, but the incivility
that often accompanies political rhetoric is still jarring and depressing for most of us. Regardless of our
ideological preferences, we are hardly inspired by presidents being called village idiots or portrayed as
Hitler. It is too far gone, it’s unproductive, and while incivility makes good television and YouTube
fodder, thinking citizens would rather see real debate and a measure of respect among those who disagree.” Herbst recommends, as a way to develop citizens’ abilities to participate in “real debate,” a culture of argument In Rude Democracy: Civility and Incivility in American Politics (2010), Herbst suggests universities and colleges are ideally situated to create and nurture that culture of argument. She
suggests there are any number of steps that universities can implement to do so, from developing “civility codes” (as opposed to hate speech codes, which are often too difficult to manage) to making
space—both formal and informal—for respectful disagreement, argument, and debate.
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greement pragmatically—as a method of problem-solving within a community rather than
simply a method for obtaining the truth—in most cases, we should not just agree to disagree.
2. WHAT IS PEER DISAGREEMENT?
The epistemology of disagreement has recently captured the imaginations of many philosophers working in the area of social epistemology. Although there are a number of
issues that define this relatively new area of inquiry, a debate central to the epistemology
of disagreement deals with peer disagreement, wherein the question is raised of how to
respond in the face of disagreement from one’s epistemic peers. In this section, I will
outline the central issues that shape discussions about peer disagreement, a debate that,
given the current political climate in the United States, is both relevant and timely. There
are two components of the phenomenon of peer disagreement. I will define each of them
here hoping that how they come together will be fairly self-evident, and that it leaves
nothing out. I will begin by looking at what it means to be a “peer.”
In their introduction to the new anthology Disagreement (2010), Richard Feldman and Ted A. Warfield suggest that philosophers who discuss the phenomenon of peer
disagreement intend “peer” to mean something fairly specific. They write,
In an attempt to focus and regiment the philosophical discussion, those addressing this epistemological issue typically assume that the agents in question are peers in a more specific
semi-technical sense [than the “unanalyzed ordinary language understanding of that term”]. In
the stipulative sense of ‘peer’ introduced, peers literally share all evidence and are equal with
respect to their abilities and dispositions relevant to interpreting that evidence. (2010: 2).

And although this stipulative definition is certainly idealized, the hope is that what can be
discovered by examining these cases will shed light on the more common and complex
situations of disagreement that arise in everyday life. As David Christensen—whose
work in support of the conciliatory view I will explore in greater detail below—points
out, discussions about disagreement quickly become complicated in large, social contexts. Thus, philosophers have generally focused on simplified cases, hoping that what is
discovered by examining these will result in general principles that can be extended to the
instances of peer disagreement we run into in everyday encounters. Thus, social epistemologists tend to focus on
simplified two-person cases where (1) one has good reason to believe that the other person is,
in some sense, one’s “epistemic peer”—one’s (at least rough) equal in evidence and intellectual virtue, and (2) one has no special evidence (such as evidence of one party’s drunkenness
or emotional attachments) that would introduce clearly relevant asymmetries in the specific
case. (Christensen 2009b: 231)3

3

And although idealized situations are clearly not ideal, as it were, there are some positive attributes to
the work being done on peer disagreement. In particular, although the context set out by these philosophers is idealized, the specifics that make up that context are not. That is to say, although the epistemic
situation is idealized, those who are the “peers” within this situation are not themselves idealized beyond what is required by the context. Thus, whereas initial investigations into peer disagreement focused on experts, current discussions have moved away from idealized knowers to focus on knowers in
idealized contexts. As Feldman and Warfield put it, “the idealization is consistent with a maximally
wide range of information and skill levels: the idealization is to comparative eq1uality of information
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Given this rather specific definition of “peer,” what is meant by “disagreement” in discussions of “peer disagreement”? Do we intend contradictory conclusions, such that only
one party to the disagreement can be correct? Most of those individuals engaged with this
topic suggest some version of the above; positions which can range from the belief that
one belief will be “optimal” according to the evidence and the purpose the belief serves
(Christensen), to the belief that only one belief will be “true,” and is therefore the reasonable belief to hold (Feldman). This debate occurs within related discussions over whether
it is ever possible for disagreements to be “reasonable.” That is, is it possible for two parties to disagree, but for both parties nevertheless to hold reasonable positions? I will talk
about this in the next section.
Given the reality of peer disagreement, the question with which we are faced is
what to do when it occurs. That is, when faced with disagreement from my epistemic
peer, how should I react? In the next two sections, I will explore the two possible responses so far forwarded. The first is the conciliatory view, which is generally defended
epistemologically. The second is the steadfast view, which is generally defended on practical grounds.
3. CONCILIATORY VIEWS
Philosophers who defend the conciliatory position suggest that, when faced with disagreement from one’s epistemic peers, the best response is to diminish the confidence one
has in one’s own belief. One of the lead proponents of this view is David Christensen,
who argues that disagreement offers us opportunities for epistemic self-improvement
(2007: 10). Peer disagreement arises, Christensen argues, when “one does not have any
special reason to think that the person with whom one disagrees has more (or less) evidence, or is more (or less) likely to react to that evidence in the right way” (2007: 3). He
asserts, “My opinion is the one that is best supported by the evidence I had before talking
to my friend. But my friend’s belief is additional evidence, which bears on the probability
that I made a mistake in my initial judgment” (2007: 31). In other words, unless there is
reason to assume another person is less competent than the average person (or than you,
at least), her disagreement should be seriously considered and your confidence reduced.
The only time this is not the correct approach is if you know yourself to be in an epistemically privileged person vis-à-vis a particular belief, which will happen in a number of
cases, particularly with regards to fields in which you are an expert. But in general, disagreement from one’s epistemic peers should always be taken seriously, and taken as evidence that prompts you to lessen the confidence you have in your own contrary belief.
The question will inevitably arise: what if there is more than one rational response to the evidence? In such a situation, is it possible that both peers could be right,
and hence there is no reason to downgrade the confidence you have in your own belief?
and skill and does not involve further idealization to maximal (or even a high level of) information and
extraordinary skill” (2010: 2). And although this is a small step, it is by no means an insignificant one.
Indeed, such an account surely takes into account many of the stronger critiques of traditional epistemological projects to account for the fact that knowers are not always ideal, interchangeable, “S’s” in “Sknows-that-p,” propositional epistemologies. Rather, knowers are situated, both within a cultural and
historical framework, and in relation—both oppositionally and cooperatively, to other knowers. So, by
not idealizing knowers themselves, this is hopefully a step in the right direction.
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As Christensen puts it, “the whole point of the live-and-let-live attitude is that my friend
and I might both be maximally rational in our responses to the evidence” (2007: 34). Yet
Christensen argues this does not mean that the obligation toward conciliation disappears.
Just because multiple interpretations of the evidence might be possible and indeed even
valid, “the case for belief-change does evaporate so readily” (2007: 34). Christensen argues that, even though disagreement itself does not provide sufficient reason to revisit
one’s own beliefs, it should indicate the possibility that one or the other belief is, as he
puts it, “rationally suboptimal” (2007: 34). In other words, given the various metrics on
which simplicity and fit with the data might be measured, it is likely that one belief will
be optimal compared with others.
Richard Feldman, who also supports a (more moderate) conciliatory view, similarly answers in the negative in response to the question of whether both peers could be
right. He argues,
in situations of full disclosure, where there are not evident asymmetries, the parties to the
disagreement would be reasonable in suspending judgment about the matter at hand. There
are, in other words, no reasonable disagreements after full disclosure, and thus no mutually recognized reasonable disagreements. The cases that seem to be cases of reasonable disagreement
are cases in which the reasonable attitude is really suspension of judgment. (2008: 235)

In other words, there is no such thing as a disagreement that is reasonable on Feldman’s
view. Thus, since one of the parties to a disagreement must be wrong (since only one can
be right), the most reasonable course of action is to reduce the confidence one has in one’s
own belief. Feldman concludes, “more often than we might have thought, suspension of
judgement is the epistemically proper attitude” (2008: 217). He goes on to make the more
(epistemologically) radical claim that “It follows that in such cases we lack reasonable belief and so, at least on standard conceptions, knowledge” (2008: 217). In other words, in
situations of peer disagreement, Feldman thinks we are provided with sufficient evidence to
conclude that beliefs are not reasonable and, as such, we cannot claim to possess knowledge.
4. STEADFAST VIEWS
In opposition to thinkers like Christensen and Feldman, some have argued that a perpetual “downgrading” of confidence in one’s beliefs in the face of disagreement from one’s
peers would lead to an unwieldy level of skepticism. Sometimes it is necessary (and
therefore justified) to believe something even if one’s peers disagree with regards to that
belief; the risks entailed by skepticism are simply too high.
Peter van Inwagen is a leading proponent of this view, which is called the
“steadfast” view in debates about peer disagreement. He suggests that, as a matter of fact,
the sort of disagreement we call “peer disagreement” occurs regularly, particularly over
the sorts of controversial issues that emerge in philosophical and political realms. He suggests that, given a (controversial) proposition, there will be “many who accept this proposition and many who accept its denial.” (2010: 9) He continues to point out, however, that
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almost no one who accepts it believes that an intelligent, rational person who was in possession of a reasonable proportion of the relevant and available facts would accept its denial.
And almost no one who denies it believes that a person who was intelligent and in possession
of a reasonable proportion of the relevant and available facts would accept it. (2010: 9)

In other words, for any given proposition that is controversial, such as “God created the
universe,” or “health care is a basic human right,” you will find people who adhere to its
affirmation or to its denial. Those who affirm the proposition will not believe that another
person, similarly situated, could deny the proposition, and vice-versa. Moreover, those
who affirm the proposition will view another similarly situated person who arrives at the
opposite conclusion as both mistaken and irrational. People who hold this view are, according to van Inwagen, “strong exclusivists” (2010: 9). These people, he suggests—and
most of us are strong exclusivists when it comes to political and philosophical issues—
therefore will not (and likely ought not) revise their beliefs in the face of contradictory
evidence that emerges in the form of disagreement. After all, an epistemic peer who disagrees with your conclusion will be mistaken and irrational, and why would someone
think the evidence offered by such an individual is warranted or valid?
Thus, as van Inwagen puts it,
Everyone who is intellectually honest will admit … that there are interminable political debates with highly intelligent and well-informed people on both sides. And yet few will react
to this state of affairs by becoming political skeptics, by declining to have any political beliefs that are disputed by highly intelligent and well-informed people. (1996: 142)

He concludes that it is unreasonable to “listen to the whispers of Clifford’s ghost
[…and…] become an agnostic about everything but empirically verifiable matters of
fact” (2010: 28). In other words, van Inwagen finds himself unable to follow Clifford’s
famous exhortation from “The Ethics of Belief”: “It is wrong, always, everywhere, and
for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence” (2008: 262). As a result, van
Inwagen further suggests that the evidence for any given belief does not force us to conclude one thing or another, at least not in terms of our philosophical and political beliefs.
If the evidence was persuasive, then, as he suggests, “our philosophical and political beliefs, surely, would be far more uniform than they are.” (1996: 150) Of course, this does
not mean that there is more than one “right” answer; only that, in many cases, the evidence does not provide an answer to the question, which one?
5. APPLYING THE CONCILIATORY (EPISTEMIC) DEFENSE
TO THE STEADFAST VIEW
The steadfast view has so far been defended against its opponents on practical grounds.4
It is important to note that van Inwagen’s defense of the steadfast position does not rely
on relativism; his is not an epistemic defense. That is, he does not recommend his view
because he thinks both the affirmation and the denial of any given proposition could be
true. Instead, it has been argued that it quite simply is impractical to reduce the confi4

This is not to suggest that other grounds are not possible, but only that so far they have not been forwarded. I look forwarded to engaging with other possible defenses of the steadfast view, or attempts to
bridge the gap between and therefore bring together these two perspectives.
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dence one has in one’s own beliefs every time one is faced with disagreement from one’s
peers. In this section, I will not engage directly with this defense, but rather explore how
well the steadfast view fares when examined through the lens of the epistemic defense
provided for the conciliatory view. It is my hope that such an exploration will reveal
more clearly the deficiencies in the steadfast view. Those in support of the conciliatory
view offer an epistemological argument for their position, which itself has two components. First, good knowers revise their beliefs in light of new and relevant evidence,
which disagreement from one’s peers clearly is. Second, truth is better served by conciliation, because it prompts further interrogation into the truth. The question I want to ask is
whether the steadfast view can lay equal claim to the epistemological benefits the defenders of the conciliatory view argue result from their position. So the question before us is
as follows: can remaining steadfast in one’s beliefs in the face of disagreement from
one’s peers be considered the right thing to do, epistemically speaking? That is, would an
individual, in her role as knower, be thought to be doing the right thing if, when faced
with disagreement, she does not reduce the confidence she has in her own belief?
Van Inwagen argues that those who support the conciliatory view place the bar
too low by suggesting that beliefs must be doubted when faced with any contrary evidence, including peer disagreement. But surely one could argue that he places the bar for
doubt too high. After all, if disagreement from an epistemic peer does not provide us with
reason to revisit our own beliefs, then what will? To be charitable to van Inwagen, it is
unlikely that he would suggest individuals never revise their beliefs in light of new evidence. His claim is more descriptive than that—he suggests that, as a matter of fact, we
tend not to revise our beliefs, particularly about political and philosophical matters, simply because a peer disagrees with us. However, it is the underlying philosophical assumptions that inform his view that are relevant to the query I pose above.
Van Inwagen’s defense of the steadfast view relies on an assumption of a particular type of knowledge, namely, propositional knowledge. More specifically, remaining
steadfast is the correct response if one adheres to the view that knowledge is propositional. The reliance of van Inwagen’s argument on the assumption of propositional
knowledge is evidenced in the following quote:
Let us consider politics. Almost everyone will admit that it makes a difference what people
believe about politics—I am using the word in its broadest possible sense- and it would be
absurd to say that propositions like Capital punishment is an ineffective deterrent or "Nations
that do not maintain a strong military capability actually increase the risk of war" are not
about matters of empirical fact. And yet people disagree about these propositions (and scores
of others of equal importance), and their disagreement about them bear a disquieting resemblance to the disagreements of philosophers about nominalism and free will and the coveringlaw model. That is, their disagreements are matters of interminable debate, and impressive
authorities can be found on both sides of many of the interminable debates. (2010: 3)

If knowledge is propositional, and any given proposition can only be either affirmed or
denied, and if there is equal evidence for either its affirmation or proposition, then it
makes sense that practical considerations are the only way to decide whether to affirm or
deny the proposition. This is why Van Inwagen must resort to a practical defense.
Science is seen as the paradigm of propositional knowledge, insofar as it is intended to conduct experiments and produce true propositions, or hard facts. Because scientific knowledge is viewed as the ideal type of knowledge, where agreement is easier to
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attain that is knowledge about philosophical or political issues, the latter are seen to fall
short. However, I suggest it is best to turn this view on its head or, as critics of the positivist
project like Richard Rorty have recommended, to remove science from the epistemological
pedestal on which it has been placed. Once the distinction between hard fact and soft value
goes, the only relevant difference that is left is the degree of agreement. Rorty echoes the
concern I express here about van Inwagen’s views on agreement about hard facts and soft
values. Rorty rejects the fact-value distinction insofar as he does not see it as a difference
that makes a difference. He suggests, “the difference between statements about torture and
statements about knives and forks is not their different ‘status’ but their different degrees of
importance to the ends that we, the people who debate these statements, wish to achieve.”
(Rorty, 1996: 66) In other words, statements or beliefs about facts do not differ in kind
from statements or beliefs about values, but only in degree. This comment echoes, in an
interesting way, his further suggestion that the distinction between knowledge and opinion
is “simply the distinction between topics on which such agreement is relatively easy to get
and topics on which agreement is relatively hard to get.” (Rorty, 1991: 23) So whereas Rorty concedes that agreement is more difficult to get in philosophy and politics than it is in
the sciences, this is the only relevant difference between the two fields.
The epistemological benefits of replacing assumptions about propositional
knowledge with something more like the perspective Rorty offers should be clear. Indeed, if one eliminates the distinction between fact and value, and moves away from seeing propositional knowledge as the paradigm of knowledge, the epistemic advantage in
the phenomenon of peer disagreement tips toward the conciliatory perspective. If the only
relevant difference between science and philosophy or politics is that agreement is easy to
attain in the former, and quite difficult to attain in the latter, this does not eliminate the
motivation or need to further seek agreement. It may be granted that provisional beliefs
will be required while further agreement is sought. For example, we have to elect political leaders whether or not we agree with them or with others about their platforms. But a
recognition of fallibilism and an attitude of cautious optimism that leads to public deliberation aimed at reaching agreement regarding even the most controversial issues, is epistemically superior to the steadfast view defended by thinkers such as van Inwagen.
6. APPLYING THE STEADFAST (PRACTICAL) DEFENSE
TO THE CONCILIATORY VIEW
I have shown that, epistemologically, the conciliatory view fares better than the steadfast
view. I will now turn to an examination of which view works better practically speaking.
Typically, the steadfast view is defended on practical grounds. Van Inwagen argues, for
example, that downgrading one’s beliefs every time one is faced with disagreement with
one’s peers would lead to an untenable level of skepticism. My goal in this section is to
see whether it might not be the case that it is better, practically speaking, to support the
conciliatory view.
Christensen and Feldman both assert that, in any given situation, for any given
body of evidence, there is only one reasonable or rationally optimal conclusion possible.
This is because neither Christensen nor Feldman recognize the extent to which nonepistemic factors might influence the outcome of belief formation. Instead, this conclusion, in a way similar to the conclusion forwarded by van Inwagen, is limited by its reli-
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ance on the assumption that knowledge is propositional. If you adhere to a propositional
account of knowledge, there are only two possible valences for any given proposition:
true or false. However, if we allow that knowledge can take more forms than just propositional, then it is possible to retain the idea that disagreements are possible where both
parties are “right” or, at the very least, take up positions that are equally reasonable. It is
likely—in fact, even more than likely—that the same body of evidence will result in different beliefs depending on the purposes for which that evidence and its resultant beliefs
are intended. Surely disagreement could occur between/among epistemic peers if they have
different purposes in attaining and espousing a belief?5 The fact that it is possible for multiple persons to be right even though they disagree does not, however, lend greater credence
to the steadfast view. Rather, it should prompt further discussion not only of the means to
attain certain ends, but also of the ends as well, which might themselves be under dispute.
7. CONCLUSION
This means that my pragmatist reading of the phenomenon of peer disagreement differs
significantly from Cheryl Misak’s. She has suggested a pragmatist reading of the peer
disagreement debate, although she offers a very different argument than the one I offer
here. In “Making Disagreement Matter: Pragmatism and Deliberative Democracy,”
Misak engages with and applaud’s Huw Price’s pragmatist views on disagreement because he, as Misak puts it, “shows that open deliberation aimed at truth is justified, because only it can explain why disagreements matter to us” (2004: 11). She continues,
The very essence of the norm of truth, argues Price, is to give disagreement its immediate
normative character (168). It is to make disagreement matter: Without truth, the wheels of argument do not engage; disagreements slide past one another (185). In order to really engage
others in conversation or dialogue, we have to see their disagreement as implying a mistake
on someone’s part. Otherwise, we are merely talking past each other. The flip side of this
point is that without truth, we could not find the conceptual space to formulate the idea of
improving upon our beliefs. Indeed, the norm of truth encourages improvement by motivating speakers who disagree to try to resolve the disagreement. For disagreement, again, implies a mistake on someone’s part. (Misak 2004: 16)

In other words, Misak posits truth as a limit condition that shapes our deliberative practices. Without this sort of limit, disagreement itself would not be possible. Although I
agree (to an extent) with Misak that disagreement implies a “mistake on someone’s part”
(p. 16), I do not agree that this is necessarily a mistake about truth. Instead, the “mistake”
that has been made indicates a different view regarding what ends are best, or regarding
what means might best satisfy those ends.
Thus, I present a reading of the phenomenon of peer disagreement that is more
“radically” pragmatist than Misak’s. My reading depends upon a deflation of the distinction between hard facts (and so, science) and soft values (and so, politics and philoso5

The fact that I have even raised this question may indicate a position already taken on the debate about
“the uniqueness thesis,” which states that “a given body of evidence justifies exactly one attitude toward
any particular proposition” (Feldman and Warfield 2010: 6). In other words, it is still an open question
whether or not a body of evidence leads to one and only one right answer, and that all other possible conclusions are therefore wrong. As the editors of Disagreement put it, “Whether a body of evidence can actually justify multiple attitudes is an open question, central to the literature on disagreements” (ibid.).
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phy), an emphasis on situatedness and contextuality, which arises out of a recognition
that purposes play a significant role in when and how agreement emerges, and thereby, a
refocusing of our conceptions of knowledge and truth. This collection of tools is made
available by the pragmatist perspective of Richard Rorty, and can lend greater clarity to
the debate over peer disagreement. What the application of these tools reveals is that—
most of the time, and for both epistemic and practical reasons—it is better to do more
than just agree to disagree.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In this paper Susan Dieleman argues that the “conciliatory” position in the contemporary
debate over peer disagreement possesses epistemic advantages that recommend it over its
rival, the “steadfast” position. After locating the debate within the context of American
political discourse and clearly and carefully setting out the positions at issue Dieleman
proceeds to her argument which, as I make it out, roughly goes as follows:
(A) The conciliatory position on peer disagreement possesses two key advantages:
(a) It captures the intuition that good knowers count peer disagreement as evidence which is relevant to their beliefs and as such can motivate belief revision,
and (b) it better servers the truth because it “prompts further interrogation into
the truth”
(B) The steadfast position (particularly as represented by Peter van Inwagen) cannot
claim these advantages.
(C) Thus the conciliatory position ought to carry the day.
I believe that Dieleman’s conclusion is fundamentally correct, though I have some misgivings about her support for the second premise of the argument. In these comments
therefore I will briefly lay out what I think the potential problems are with the second
premise, and offer some considerations that I believe support her overall case for the conciliatory position.
Dieleman’s case against the steadfast position proceeds in what I will call two
“movements”. The first is epistemic, the second is practical. I will consider each of these
movements, beginning with the epistemic.
2. THE EPISTEMIC MOVEMENT
Dieleman raises a number of objections to the “steadfast” position that are designed to
show its epistemic inadequacy. The first of these is that, in precluding that we might treat
the opinions of epistemic peers as evidence that bears on our own beliefs, it sets the bar
for what would count as relevant evidence. Secondly, Dieleman takes van Inwagen to
task for assuming a propositional model of knowledge. The problematic underpinnings of
this model, she contends, are what force van Inwagen into a steadfast position on peer
Zenker, F. (ed.). Argumentation: Cognition and Community. Proceedings of the 9th International Conference of the
Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), May 18-21, 2011. Windsor, ON (CD ROM), pp. 1-4.
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disagreement. Instead, she urges that a Rortyan view of knowledge would avoid these
mistakes and, by extension, the steadfast position that arises from them. These considerations make up the epistemological side of Dieleman’s case.
The first premise of Dieleman’s epistemological case is surely right. If the concept of an epistemic peers is of persons who are endowed with equal powers of reasoning
and reflection, then when one of them brings to the discussion a belief or set of beliefs
based on full information and the full use of her powers of reasoning and reflection, then
it seems unwise to say the least for her peer simply to disregard her thoughts on the matter. To insist, as van Inwagen apparently does, that such considerations are not relevant–
not even from the standpoint of an ideally reasonable and reflective person with a desire
to have beliefs of the best possible epistemic quality–is puzzling to say the least. To dismiss it as Cliffordian hand-wringing is to turn a blind eye to the notion, very important
within the history of philosophy and particularly within the history of ethics, that the
opinions of knowledgable others play a crucial role in making and evaluating moral
judgements. If one forecloses on the possibility of treating such opinions as relevant to
one’s own, then one deprives oneself of much that it is good in the moral philosophy of
Adam Smith, David Hume, and John Stuart Mill just to name a few. Surely this is too
high a price to pay for a steadfast view of peer disagreement.
Though I certainly agree with the first of Dieleman’s premises, the second premise strikes me both as problematic and unnecessary. The criticisms of Rorty’s view are so
well and widely known that for general purposes it may simply suffice here for me to register myself as a member of the opposition. That said, there is one consideration that I think
is especially relevant to the problem of peer disagreement that I think bears emphasis.
It is well known that Rorty opposes distinctions between types of knowledge.
Whatever the merits of doing so, one of the costs one pays comes in terms of one’s ability
to evaluate beliefs by their pedigree. To some degree the language of peer disagreement
obscures this feature of the discussion, but really it builds in the notion of doxastic pedigree through the construction of what it means to be an epistemic peer. The common
characterization of epistemic peers–shared in the main by both the conciliatory and steadfast positions–consists of a list of factors that, in another context, would be vectors along
which a belief could be challenged in a series of questions. For example, when Smith tells
me that he does not believe that Osama bin Laden is dead I might wonder:
(A) whether he tends, as a rule to form his beliefs in at least a reasonable way as I try
to do,
(B) whether or not Smith is in possession of evidence that I am not, or whether
things are the other way ’round, or
(C) whether or not Smith has really used his powers of reasoning and reflection in
thinking about the evidence in his possession.
It is clear, I think, that I can ask these questions in the spirit of trying to discover something about Smith, or in the spirit of trying to discover something about Smith’s belief in
this case. This distinction is important for multiple reasons, but for present purposes what
is important to see is that no matter which way the questions are asked, bound up within
them, under the cover of the vagueness and ambiguity of the phrase “what counts as reasonable” are nearly always going to be questions of method that entail more robust considerations than what one can simply be persuaded to agree to believe. It is method that to
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some degree or other distinguishes the domains of knowledge that Rorty would eliminate.
Contra Rorty, it seems reasonable to suppose that one need not think that science is paradigmatic of knowledge in order to appreciate that the methods involved in forming scientific beliefs are importantly different from the methods involved in forming aesthetic beliefs. One does not judge the aesthetic merit of paintings by measuring their mass. Similarly, one does not decide whether or not to have experimental surgery because of the
beauty and delicateness of the instruments that will be used.
To be a good knower, then, is partly to appreciate this sort of distinction and to
use, wherever possible, the domain-appropriate means for forming beliefs. How one can
conceive of something like an epistemic peer relationship without bringing such considerations to bear in at least some way isn’t clear to me. On Rorty’s view of knowledge,
where there are no domains and there are only statements about which we agree or disagree in greater or larger numbers with more or less conviction, there are no judgments to
make about epistemic peer relationships. In the land of pure doxa, where the only method
of belief formation is persuasion and the only measure of a belief’s justification is agreement, everyone is an epistemic peer to everyone else. This may be an admirably democratic sentiment, but it ill-fits experience and it renders the concept of epistemic peer in
use in the current debate somewhat moot. Thankfully, Dieleman doesn’t need it to reach
her conclusion.
3. THE PRACTICAL MOVEMENT
The principal reason Dieleman’s argument for the conciliatory position survives comes in
her discussion of the practical considerations motivating the conciliatory view. She begins the practical movement of her paper by extending her Rortyan critique to the conciliatory position (my emphasis):
Christensen and Feldman both assert that, in any given situation, for any given body of evidence, there is only one reasonable or rationally optimal conclusion possible. This is because
neither Christenssen nor Feldman recognize the extent to which non-epistemic factors might
influence the outcome of belief formation. (Dieleman 2011: 10)

The last sentence of this quote has all the force that Dieleman’s argument requires, but it
must be held in the mind very carefully. For while it is imperative to situate the knower in
order to understand the background information with which, and the general habits of
reasoning according to which he or she forms beliefs, we must be careful to avoid conflating this task with a kind of amateur psychoanalysis of the knower. Great care must be
taken in discerning epistemic from non-epistemic factors that bear on belief formation.
Among epistemic factors one might include the knower’s background beliefs, her habits
of reason, and the conditions under which the beliefs at issue have been formed (e.g. if
the belief is perceptual, the conditions under which the perception is made, when those
are relevant, should be noted). Among non-epistemic but still relevant factors would include the knower’s desire or intention to have factually accurate beliefs (or lack thereof),
the ways in which the roles the knower plays in the various groups to which he belongs
bear on the epistemic commitments he is willing (or perhaps able) to make, and the character or mood of any dialogical exchange or context that might have played a role in
forming the particular belief(s) in question. Such factors are rightly thought of as non-
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epistemic because none of them are direct paths from evidence to belief. My intention to
have true beliefs, for example, doesn’t by itself produce beliefs so much as it does change
the way I go about the process of settling on what to believe. Similarly, in some cases
where it might be questionable that genuine knowledge is even possible, a deeply religious person might make and evaluate doxastic commitments according to what he or she
takes to be a moral obligation to uphold his or her faith, regardless of how the matter sits
from straightforwardly epistemic considerations. These are just two examples. Certainly
the range of such considerations could easily be expanded.
The point here, of course, is that Dieleman is right. Such things matter if one really wishes to understand, let alone work towards a resolution of any deep disagreement.
We differ only over the question of whether a Rortyan position on knowledge is necessary to endorse this idea.
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